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Abstract: This paper investigates the credit supply of banks in response to domestic and foreign 
real estate price changes. Using a large international dataset of multinational banks, we find 
evidence of a significant transmission of domestic real estate shocks into lending abroad. A 1% 
decrease in real estate prices in home country, in particular, leads to a 0.2-0.3% decrease in credit 
growth in the foreign subsidiary. This response, however, is asymmetric: only negative house 
price changes are transmitted. Stricter regulation of activities of parent banks can reduce this 
effect, indicating a role for regulation in alleviating the transmission of real estate shocks. 
Further, the analysis of the impact of real estate shocks on foreign subsidiary funding indicates 
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1. Introduction 
In the early 2000s the U.S. enjoyed a credit boom and sizeable increases in housing prices. 
Unfortunately, the housing market turned in 2006, triggering a financial crisis, which proved to 
be systemic in 2007 and 2008. Indeed, the decline in house prices has been seen as one of the 
fundamental causes of the recent financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2009). However, the U.S. was 
not a unique case. Starting from 2007, the world economy quickly slid into a recession that 
emanated mainly from the banking systems of the developed economies. During this period 
many economies experienced collapses in real estate prices and many blamed the souring of real 
estate related assets such as mortgage-backed securities and real estate loans for the financial 
turmoil. Hence, a key question is the extent to which the banking system propagates shocks to 
the pricing of real estate related assets internationally.  
As complex organizations that offer multiple services in various geographical markets, 
multinational banks are well suited to study the question at hand. Following financial 
liberalization, consolidation, and integration in many countries, cross-border banking activities 
have grown dramatically in recent decades.
2
 In the pursuit of higher profitability and 
diversification, numerous banks extended their activities beyond their home countries, opening 
branches or subsidiaries abroad. Home countries of these banks exhibit diverse house price 
histories in both before and after the global financial crisis.  
In this paper this variation in house prices are used to investigate whether real estate shocks 
are transmitted through multinational banks to local credit supply, as well as the implications of 
such shocks for the funding structure of foreign bank subsidiaries. The data cover the years 
1999-2011, and is based on more than 600 foreign bank subsidiaries from an international 
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 See Claessens and Van Horen (2013), and Bank of International Settlement (BIS) report (2010) for detailed 
discussions and recent trends. 
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sample of 53 countries.  According to the results, price changes in real estate markets in home 
countries have economically and statistically significant effects on credit growth abroad through 
foreign bank subsidiaries.  This finding is robust to various alternative specifications and 
subsamples. Additionally, this effect is asymmetric: negative parent country real estate price 
shocks have a significant impact, which is not the case for positive shocks. Moreover, stricter 
home country banking regulation regarding the real estate activities of parent banks reduces the 
effect of the transmission, indicating the importance of regulation. 
The findings indicate that informational problems drive the transmission results. Specifically, 
in response to a negative change in home country real estate prices, foreign bank subsidiaries 
from neighboring countries or culturally related countries decrease their credit supply less 
compared to others. This is because informational asymmetries or political motivations play an 
important role in the transmission of real estate price shocks. Better information or closer 
relationships (proxied by contiguity and common language) seem to mitigate the cross-border 
transmission of house prices.  
The results do not support the alternative channels, securitization and moral suasion by 
national authorities, possibly affecting the transmission of real estate shocks. Securitization 
enables banks to transfer risks such as mortgage portfolios to third parties, which in theory can 
handle them. This, in turn, should make banks less responsive to real estate prices, reducing the 
cross-border transmission. Nevertheless, we show that the aggregate securitization activity at the 
parent country not only fails to mitigate the transmission of real estate price changes, it may even 
decrease the host country’s credit supply, which may be caused by collapses in secondary loan 
markets during the financial crisis.  
 4
Countries responded to the recent financial crisis in different ways; supporting their banking 
systems through recapitalizations, asset purchases, or nationalizations. Some policy responses 
are bank specific (like a bank nationalization), but there are indirect benefits for the banking 
system as a whole. How banking system uses this support by the governments is highly political, 
as the main motivation for governments is to stabilize the credit supply at home. Yet, banks can 
choose to use this support to increase lending abroad, where opportunities may be relatively 
better due to an event in real estate market. Alternatively they may use it to curb lending at 
home.  Thus, national authorities may put pressure on the parent banks to decrease the credit 
supply in their foreign subsidiaries (Kamil and Rai, 2010). We use the policy responses of parent 
countries to recent financial crisis to proxy the incentives for national authorities. The more 
recapitalizations and asset purchases or nationalization occur in the home country, higher the 
probability of national authorities to use moral suasion for parent banks to decrease credit 
abroad. However, there is no evidence to support that. If anything, the transmission is weaker for 
the foreign bank subsidiaries, whose parent banks are from countries responding heavily to the 
recent financial crisis by recapitalizations, asset purchases, and nationalizations.  
In addition, the transmission of real estate price changes comes mainly from the later part of 
the sample. The effect of the capital channel (or parent support), on the other hand, seems to be 
relevant for the earlier years but not after the recent financial crisis – confirming the results of De 
Haas and van Lelyveld (2013). Further, the examination of the funding structure of foreign 
subsidiaries reveals that the changes in credit supply are mainly due to the fluctuations in long-
term debt funding and equity in response to home country house price changes.  
There is a large literature on the impact of cross-border banking activities on financial 




 An essential feature in this literature is the importance of internal 
capital markets. Previous studies show that the loan supply in one geographical market depends 
not only on local banks’ balance sheets, but also on the parent bank’s cash flow and financing 
options in other geographical markets it operates. In their seminal paper, Houston, James and 
Marcus (1997) find that the operation of internal capital markets is important in explaining loan 
supply at the individual subsidiary level. They find that local loan supply is sensitive to holding-
wide cash flow rather than merely to local cash flow. 
For an international bank, internal capital markets are also of importance, given that global 
banks manage the capital requirement ratios of their local subsidiaries. The literature takes two 
approaches to illustrate the transmission of financial shocks through foreign banks. The first one 
focuses on macro-financial linkages using aggregate data to show the transmission through 
banking integration. Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) is an important example. Using the U.S. 
as a multi-market banking system, they show that interstate bank ownership has an effect on the 
volatility of real economic activity within states, making state business cycles smaller and more 
similar. In a recent paper, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2013) show how financial integration through 
global banks makes the international business cycles divergent in general, but less so during the 
financial turmoil periods. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) also use data on aggregate international 
lending activity and document the transmission of the recent financial crisis from developed 
countries to emerging markets through global banks. 
The other approach concentrates on bank-level data and on specific countries as home and/or 
host countries. For example, in their influential article, Peek and Rosengren (1997) focus on the 
U.S. as the host country and Japan as the home country. They find that a negative shock in 
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 Allen et al. (2011) provide a detailed discussion for Europe, whereas Claessens et al. (2001) compare foreign and 
domestic banks both in developed and developing countries.  
 6
Japanese stock prices affected the lending activities of Japanese banks in the U.S. In another 
paper, Peek and Rosengren (2000) illustrate how the Japanese banking crisis influenced real 
economic activity -specifically construction activity- in U.S. commercial real estate markets 
through Japanese banks in the U.S. More recently, Schnabl (2012) used the 1998 Russian default 
as a negative liquidity shock to international banks and analyzed its impact on Peru through these 
international banks. There are other papers, which use lender heterogeneity from loan-level data 
to illustrate the international transmission of the recent financial crisis or possible credit supply 
differences of foreign owned banks.
4
 Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) focus on intra-banking 
group flows during the financial crisis to open up the black box of internal capital markets of 
U.S. global banks, illustrating a locational pecking order for liquidity management. De Haas and 
Van Horen (2013), on the other hand, use an international loan-level panel with a similar focus 
on the recent financial crisis and confirm that banks reduce their credit supply selectively 
depending on their geographical and informational positions.  
In recent years this literature started to employ more international bank-level data, increasing 
the number of countries in the sample rather than focusing on one country as host or home. De 
Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) use an international sample of – mostly - developed countries, 
and provide evidence regarding the existence and functioning of internal capital markets. In 
another paper, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2013) use a similar dataset, which includes the global 
crisis period (2007-2009), and show that parent support may not be effective if the parent itself is 
in trouble. Further evidence on the internal capital markets in emerging countries comes from 
Jeon et al. (2012), who confirm that internal capital markets contribute to the transmission of 
financial shocks through multinational bank subsidiaries. These papers emphasize the 
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importance of the capital channel of the internal capital markets by showing the significant 
impact of parent’s bank-level variables such as internal fund generation, liquidity, or 
capitalization on foreign subsidiary’s credit supply.
5
  
Introducing the real estate markets into the picture, Loutskina and Strahan (2012) show the 
positive causal effects of house prices on economic growth in the U.S. during the boom years 
before the recent financial crisis. They find that this effect gets bigger with financial integration, 
which in turn increases economic volatility through higher variation in house prices and through 
strengthened links between the collateral and the overall economy.  Berrospide et al. (2011) 
relate the house prices and mortgage delinquencies in the U.S. during the 2007-2009 crisis to 
lending through multi-market banks, and document the cross-state transmission. They also 
consider securitization as a possible mitigating factor in this transmission. Similar to Berrospide 
et al. (2011), this study uses the regional variation in real estate markets to identify the 
transmission, and the results of both papers are largely consistent. Nevertheless, this paper is the 
first international bank-level study focusing on alternative asset prices, namely real estate and 
stock market prices, and documenting the transmission in response to changes in those prices. It 
is especially interesting to observe multi-market banks behaving along similar lines in an 
international environment with countries pursuing divergent national interests, and in the U.S. 
where the individual states are subject to a single regulator.  
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, the focus is on a 
specific type of financial shock, namely real estate market shocks. This increases our knowledge 
of how different macroeconomic shocks -including growth in the real economy, - the changes in 
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 An alternative is the so called collateral channel, which Chang and Dasgupta (2007) found relevant on multi-
segment firms. They find that transmission to non-shock segments is not due to the lower availability of internal 
funds but to a decreased value of collateral assets and reducing availability of external finance. 
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stock markets, or real estate market prices are transmitted. Similar to De Haas and Van Lelyveld 
(2013), we use a large sample including both developed and developing countries. Unlike them, 
the paper focuses not only on huge banking conglomerates, but also on relatively smaller 
international as well as domestic players. The time coverage for the sample is better in the sense 
that it includes 2010 and 2011. During these years some recovery could be observed in the 
banking sector, while many countries were still experiencing a banking crisis.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model, data and 
the econometric methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results and various robustness 
checks for those results. Section 4 concludes with a short discussion of policy implications. 
 
2. The model, data and methodology 
2.1. The model 
To see the impact of foreign house price shocks on national economies, we employ a model 
similar to De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2013). In this model, the credit growth rate in foreign 
subsidiaries is explained by subsidiary level controls, parent level controls, and macroeconomic 
controls for both home and host countries.
6
 This model is inspired by the Morgan et al (2004) 
paper, which modifies the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) paper for a multi-market environment. 
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 Following De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2013) we use gross credit growth as the main dependent variable. Net credit 
growth and equity growth are also used in a robustness check. 
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where the subscripts i, j, and t denote the bank, the parent bank, and the year; m and n denote 
host and home countries. α and γ are bank and year fixed effects. Further, # $,,, and 
 
 ) $, are sets of bank variables including size, capital and liquidity related controls for 
local and parent bank respectively. Controlling for size is crucial as the sample contains various 
banks with different sizes. In the basic set capital and liquidity of local and parent banks are also 
included to control for solvency and soundness of these banks. &' 
(,  and 
 
 ' 
(!, are sets of macroeconomic variables, including GDP per capita, GDP per 
capita growth, inflation, and stock market indices growth in host and home countries 
respectively. The variable of interest is  
  

 	!, , thus the focus will be on 
the coefficient , which is the effect of real estate shocks in parent country on credit supply of a 
local bank -that is a foreign subsidiary. Although the emphasis will be on real estate market price 
changes, controlling for stock market changes is crucial as stock markets may be transmitted to 
foreign credit supply as well (Peek and Rosengren 1997). 
To include domestic banks into the analysis, which will create extra variation in ownership, 
we also employ an alternative model, which includes interactions between foreign ownership 
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where the variables are similar to the foreign subsidiary model explained above except the 
dummy variables  .	 , , .	  ) $, and relevant interaction terms. This specification 
allows the comparison of foreign bank subsidiaries with domestic banks as a control group. The 
impact of parent bank and parent country variables can be interpreted solely based on their 
interactions with the foreign ownership variable. In other words, parent bank and parent country 
variables are not featured in the model on their own. The number of domestic banks is much 
higher compared to foreign subsidiaries in the sample. Therefore, in a robustness check, a more 
comparable sample of domestic banks is generated using propensity matching at country-year 
level (with at least 30 observations by country-year). Foreign subsidiaries and domestic banks 
are matched according to their size, equity and liquidity measures. 
2.2. Data 
In this paper, we examine an international sample of more than 600 foreign bank subsidiaries 
located in 53 countries for the years from 1999 to 2011.
7
 Income statement and balance sheet 
information on individual banks is taken from the Bankscope database.
8
 The Bankscope 
Ownership Database is used to match parent banks with directly owned banks.
9
 Only countries 
are included in the universe of owners, for which there is real estate market information for the 
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 A similar analysis can employ Claessens and Van Horen (2013) foreign ownership data with a better coverage. 
Yet, the focus here is on foreign bank subsidiaries, thus knowing the parent banks and controlling for their 
characteristics are crucial. 
8
 Bankscope financial statements data is taken from WRDS. See Table A1 in the appendix for variable definitions. 
9
 Bankscope provides only the most recent cross-section of ownership information; we generated the ownership data 
using yearly CD’s for each year from 1999 to 2011. Only subsidiaries are included, as Bankscope does not provide 
information on branches. A caveat using solely direct ownership is the fact that part of the complex ownership 
structures of multinational banks is not captured. The ultimate ownership information could have been an 
alternative; however this would introduce too much complexity to the ownership information. Instead, basic 
ownership information is used to keep the sample as large as possible. This way the sample could contain not only 
huge multinational banks (there are only a few dozens of them) but also smaller banks. Note that these preferences 
may actually introduce a bias against the results of the paper, as the foreign subsidiaries may be affected by ultimate 
owners but not as much by direct owners. 
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relevant year. The sample includes only the banks for which more than 50% of ownership 
information was available in order to make sure that all the majority owners are identified. If a 
bank is majority owned by a foreign bank, it is counted as a foreign subsidiary. To avoid double 
entries and to better isolate shocks on specific entities we use unconsolidated statements -where 
available- for both subsidiaries and parent banks. To be able to use domestic banks as a control 
group these banks are retained.  
The macroeconomic data come from World Bank’s WDI, IMF IFS and OECD databases, 
and the banking regulation data come from The Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, 
carried out by the World Bank. Geographical and cultural distance variables are taken from the 
CEPII database. The data on systemic crisis and policy responses are from Laeven and Valencia 
(2012). The aggregate securitization variables are generated from the ABS database and CMBS 
database.
10
 Finally, real estate market data are collected from sources such as BIS, OECD and 
Dallas FED (Mack and Martínez-García 2011), and also from Global Properties Guide, a private 
company collecting data from alternative sources. We expand the Dallas FED International 
House Price Database by adding more countries but keeping the data as comparable as 
possible.
11
 We predominantly use House price indices and calculate the changes in end-of-the-
year indices and subtract consumer inflation to get the real change in real estate prices. Only 
changes in real estate prices are used, and not level information, for better comparability across 
different countries.  
                                                   
10
 These two databases are provided by Asset-Backed Alert and Commercial Mortgage alert, both produced by a 
private company. They include all asset-backed issues, mortgage-backed issues (including CMBS), and 
collateralized debt obligations. Given these issues are under the control of a trustee, rated by at least one major 
rating agency, and collateralized by assets of some kind.   
11
 We follow the Dallas FED database for the selection criteria in terms of geographic coverage (nationwide), 
vintage and type of dwellings (existing single-family) and priced unit (per dwelling). 
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Only around 7% of foreign bank subsidiaries are owned by banks from developing countries 
as defined by the World Bank, which is not surprising as most multinational banks are located in 
the developed world. Moreover, foreign bank subsidiary observations located in developing 
countries constitute around 21% of the whole sample.
12
 Thus, the sample consists mostly of data 
from developed countries, suggesting that the bulk of multinational activity still happens among 
developed countries. This observation is consistent with the De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) 
paper. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the full sample –including domestic banks and 
foreign subsidiaries- and for the parent banks and home countries, which are just for foreign 
subsidiaries observations. Average real gross credit growth in the sample is 5.1% and net credit 
growth –net of loan loss provisions- is 4.9%, suggesting that loan loss provisions do not matter 
much. Mean equity growth rate is 5.5% and mean short-term funding and deposit growth is 
5.2%, whereas the growth rate of long-term funding is very small at -0.5% with a large standard 
deviation. This may be due to the impact of global financial crisis of 2007-2009 on more fragile 
long-term funding. Growth rates larger than 100% are dropped as unreasonable, in order to avoid 
the impact of possible merger and acquisitions. 
Table 2 displays the comparison of the foreign bank subsidiaries with parent banks. Parent 
banks have slightly –yet statistically significantly- lower capitalization -measured as equity over 
total assets- (10.4% vs. 13.2%) and lower liquidity –measured as liquid assets over total assets 
(26.4% vs. 29.8%). Regarding the size of the banks, parents are considerably larger than the 
foreign subsidiaries as expected. The relative size variable, which compares the size of 
subsidiary and parent bank in terms of total assets, indicates that the assets of foreign subsidiaries 
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on average are as large as 14% of a parent’s unconsolidated assets. When subsidiaries larger than 
their parent banks are excluded, which is likely caused by complex ownership structure, average 
relative size becomes around 7%.  
In terms of macroeconomic variables, home countries experience lower real estate market 
price appreciation (1.2% vs. 2.0%) and stock market gains (2.9% vs. 6%) compared to host 
countries. This suggests that the parent banks seek better economic prospective and thus possibly 
higher profits. Yet the profits of subsidiaries –measured relative to total assets- and parent banks 
are almost the same at 1.1%.  
In Table 3, pairwise correlations of selected variables are presented. Although host and home 
real estate market price changes are significantly correlated, the correlation coefficient is rather 
low at 0.234. Indeed, the countries displayed in Figure 1 are shown to have widely varying paths 
regarding real estate price changes. Yet, the mean values for the countries in the sample, as 
shown in Figure 2a, suggest a global boom (from 2001 to 2007) and bust (during 2008 and 2009) 
and later a slow recovery in 2010 and in 2011.
13
 The stock market price changes follow a similar 
path in Figure 2, but the real estate markets are much smoother. The histogram of real estate 
market price changes (Figure 3) shows that there are more country-year observations with a 
positive price change and a fatter tail compared to the negative side –indicating possible real 
estate bubbles. Indeed, weighted mean of positive parent country real estate price changes are 
larger in absolute value compared to the negative ones (3.2% vs. -2%). 
2.3. Econometric methodology 
Three alternative econometric approaches are used in the paper, namely bank fixed effects 
regressions, pooled OLS regressions with country-fixed effects, and two-step dynamic panel 
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regressions, where both difference and system estimators are used. The benchmark regressions 
also include an IV regression, where local real estate prices are instrumented through population 
growth and bank regulation related to real estate activities, as local real estate prices respond to 
local credit supply. All regressions include one period lagged real estate price variables and 
bank-level variables to reduce endogeneity concerns. These concerns are further tackled by 
dynamic panel regressions –using differences and levels of explanatory variables as internal 
instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  
The identification strategy pursued in the paper is based on the assumption that international 
real estate prices are not perfectly correlated. This is due to the immobile nature of real estate and 
the existence of national borders as an obstacle to population mobility. Although there seems to 
be synchronization in real estate markets in recent years (Hirata et al., 2013), the co-existence of 
boom and bust national housing markets together with rather flat housing markets suggests the 
co-movements are far from perfect. Therefore, the assumption is reasonable.
14
 Using a global 
VAR analysis for 7 euro area countries,
15
 Vansteenkiste and Hiebert (2011) show that spillovers 
from country-specific house price shocks exist but their magnitude is relatively low. Figure 1 
displays the examples of countries experiencing booms and busts (e.g. Spain, United Kingdom 
and United States) together with rather stable ones (e.g. Germany, Japan and Switzerland). 
Indeed, the home and host country correlation for the foreign subsidiary sample the correlation 
coefficient is much higher for stock markets compared to real estate markets.
16
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 Note that these countries are some of the most influential countries in the cross-border banking activities. Thanks 
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 These countries are Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy and the Netherlands. 
16
 In Table 3, the correlation coefficient for equity indices of home and host countries is 0.712, whereas it is 0.234 
for real estate prices. 
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3. Empirical evidence 
In this section empirical evidence will be presented. First, we will set up the benchmark 
model and use alternative methodologies as discussed in the previous section. Second, alternative 
dependent variables, specifications, and robustness checks will be presented. This section 
concludes by investigating through which funding channel the real estate shock transmission 
may be operating –analyzing the changes in the funding structures of foreign subsidiaries.  
3.1. The impact of real estate markets 
Table 4 includes the benchmark regressions with basic bank and country level controls. 
Alternative econometric approaches are presented by using foreign subsidiary only and full 
sample settings. In almost all regressions the coefficients of parent country real estate prices are 
positive and significant. In regressions 1 and 2, where bank fixed effects are used, a 1% decrease 
in parent country real estate prices leads to a decrease of 0.25-0.3% in the credit growth of 
foreign bank subsidiaries. Regressions include controls for local real estate prices to avoid a 
possible omitted variable bias. This is crucial as the price changes in the parent real estate market 
are at least partially correlated with local real estate price changes. The impact of local real estate 
prices is insignificant for the foreign subsidiary only sample, but in other regressions it becomes 
significant in the sample where domestic banks are included. This suggests that foreign banks are 
less sensitive to local real estate shocks, which can be explained by their ability to smooth the 
shocks thanks to their parents –an opportunity not shared by domestic banks. Another 
explanation may be that their assets are not as exposed to local real estate markets as those of 
domestic banks.  
 16 
These results hold in regressions 3 and 4, where high credit growth banks are excluded 
(changes larger than 50%).
17
 In pooled OLS regressions 5 and 6, the size as well as the 
significance of the coefficients decrease, underlining the importance of bank fixed effects 
regarding the impact of parent real estate shocks. The results of the two-step GMM models, 
estimated to alleviate endogeneity concerns, stay almost the same in regressions 7 and 8. In 
regressions 9 and 10, we use instrumental variable regressions with bank fixed effects, as 
explained in the methodology section. Instrumenting local house prices may be crucial as they 
may mechanically affect the credit growth through the value of mortgages. Interestingly, when 
local house prices are instrumented the size of the coefficient for the parent country, house price 
changes gets larger especially in regression 10, where the full sample is used. There, compared to 
domestic banks, a 1% decrease in housing prices in the parent country is associated with a 0.7% 
decrease credit growth in foreign bank subsidiary. Although instruments are rather weak in both 
regressions, instrumentation is relatively well in regression 10 compared to regression 9, which 
suffers from underidentification.  
An important issue is whether this impact is economically significant. A one standard 
deviation decrease in real estate prices in the parent country (around a 7.5% decrease) leads to a 
decrease of around 2.5% in the credit growth of the foreign subsidiary. Although this is 
approximately 10% of the standard deviation of credit growth, it is almost 50% of its mean 
value. Especially given the persistence of some housing busts in certain countries (see Figure 1) 
the cumulative impact on growth rates can even be larger. Thus we argue that this is a 
considerably large impact, especially compared to the impact of local housing prices. 
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(not reported). 
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Furthermore parent bank-level variables do not have a significant impact, except a 
marginally significant positive impact of parent liquidity in a few regressions. This observation is 
in line with the most recent findings from De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2013). They show that 
parent banks were not a source of stability for their subsidiaries during the last financial crisis, 
while a large number of them were suffering from a banking crisis at home.
18
  
Looking at another important asset class, stock markets, there is a positive impact of parent 
equity markets, which is expected as they may have a similar impact on the parent-subsidiary 
relationship. Yet, the coefficients of parent equity markets are insignificant in most regressions, 
and the size of the impact is considerably smaller compared to real estate markets. More 
specifically, a one standard deviation decrease in stock market prices –around 34%- leads to a 
1% to 1.5% decrease in credit growth in the fixed effects regressions with significant parent 
equity market coefficient. Compared to the transmission of real estate price shocks, the effects of 
a stock market price change at home country on the credit supply of the host country is lower. 
This difference in credit growth sensitivity to real estate and stock markets indicates that real 
estate prices are more important compared to stock markets regarding the cross-border 
transmissions. This may be explained by the role of real estate as collateral in the economy, as an 
extra channel influencing cross-border transmission. In Figure 2b, stock markets and real estate 
markets behave similarly, but stock markets move much more sharply compared to real estate 
markets. This result might reflect that the banks are aware of the volatility of stock markets and 
are thus better prepared not to transmit the fluctuations in stock markets, which are much more 
volatile compared to real estate markets.  
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 The banking crisis at home is pervasive in the sample. With 41% of observations for foreign subsidiaries, home 
countries are in banking crisis. 
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3.2. Alternatives and robustness checks 
This section starts by using alternative dependent variables, namely net credit growth 
(excluding loan loss reserves) and equity growth, which may be important as the parents are 
managing the capitalization of their subsidiaries. The results of the regressions 1 to 4 in Table 5, 
where net credit growth regressions are presented, are almost the same as in the benchmark 
regressions, indicating that the changes in credit growth do not have a large role due to loan loss 
provisions. Alternatively, parent banks may manage book capital of their foreign subsidiaries. In 
regressions 5 to 8, however, the coefficients of parent country real estate prices are positive. 
However, they are lower and less significant compared to the credit growth regressions, 
especially for bank fixed-effects regressions. This can be explained by internal capital markets 
being operated not only through book capital but also through risk capital, which is not 
observable in book capital, possibly weakening the transmission.
19
 Still, some transmission of 
real estate price changes into equity growth rates of foreign bank subsidiaries exist, which will be 
relevant for the discussion of funding structures in the next subsection. 
Table 6 displays the robustness checks with alternative specifications and a subsample using 
bank fixed effects regressions except regressions 11 and 12, where country-year fixed effects are 
used instead. Monetary policy transmission may be an important factor, leading to both higher 
real estate prices and higher credit supply. Regressions 1 and 2 include exchange rate and interest 
rate controls for both home and host countries, but the coefficients of parent real estate prices do 
not change much. Next, a lagged dependent variable is added in the baseline bank fixed effects 
regressions 3 and 4, which introduces a bias. Yet, the results do not change dramatically.  
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 There are alternative approaches to capital management in foreign subsidiaries. For a more detailed explanation 
see De Haas and Naaborg (2006). 
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Developing countries experienced a series of crises in the late 90s and early 2000s. This 
paper investigates the effects of home country shocks, which are mainly developed countries, on 
the foreign subsidiaries, many of which are in developing countries. To be sure that this period is 
not driving the results in regression 5 and 6, we drop observations before 2002 and the results 
remain similar.  
In the full sample specification, foreign subsidiaries are compared with domestic banks. But 
domestic bank universe is very large compared to foreign bank sample. To generate a more 
comparable control group of domestic banks in regressions 7 and 8, only domestic banks and 
foreign subsidiaries are included, which are matched by propensity scoring at country-year level. 
The coefficients of parent real estate prices are similar, which provides more confidence in the 
full sample specifications.
20
 In regressions 9 and 10, the standard errors are clustered at the 
country level rather than the bank level as in the baseline regression, because error terms may be 
correlated within countries as well. Yet, the significance levels of parent real estate price changes 
are similar.  
Most importantly, the demand side effects at the host country may drive the results, in the 
sense that the credit supply of foreign subsidiaries decrease not in response to home country 
house prices but to the local credit demand conditions. In regressions 11 and 12 we tackle this 
issue by adding country-year fixed effects next to the bank fixed effects, which take all country 
level variation at the host countries away (macro variables are dropped). Although the 
coefficients of parent real estate price changes are marginally significant, the size and the sign of 
the coefficient are similar. Finally, international comparability of house price data may be an 
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 The foreign and domestic banks are matched 1 to 1 without replacement. When we include all domestic banks, 
which are matched with foreign banks at any time –ending up with a larger sample then in regression 8 but smaller 
than the full sample- the results stay similar (not reported). 
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important factor. In regressions 13 and 14 the banking universe is reduced to the Dallas FED 
International House Price Database sample only. This sample consists only of OECD countries 
and thus reduces the sample size by more than half but makes the house prices more comparable. 
The coefficient of parent real estate prices is marginally insignificant in the foreign subsidiaries 
only sample, but significant in the full sample. The sign of the coefficient is the same in both 
regressions. 
Table 7 displays alternative specifications. Internal fund creation and profitability at bank 
level may have an effect on real estate shock transmission, as they have been found significant in 
some earlier studies. Following Jeon et al. (2012), regressions 1 and 2 include internal funds 
(defined as net income over lagged loans) of both the subsidiary and parent as controls, but the 
results remain similar. When other bank level controls (profits and net interest margin) are 
included in regressions 3 and 4, as employed by De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010), the 
coefficients of the variables of interest are still similar, but the coefficient is significant only in 
regression 4. An interesting question is whether parent banks differentiate their responses to real 
estate price shocks in favor of their more important subsidiaries.  Regressions 5 and 6 include a 
relative size control, measuring the size of the subsidiary relative to the parent, and an interaction 
term with parent real estate prices. In the only foreign bank sample, this interaction term is 
negative, and in both regressions the coefficient of interest is similar to earlier findings. The 
negatively significant interaction term in the foreign subsidiary only sample implies that the 
larger the foreign subsidiary gets relative to the parent bank, the smaller is the impact of parent 
country real estate markets, thus the lower the transmission. For example, if the foreign 
subsidiary is as large as the parent bank itself, the marginal effect of the parent real estate market 
price changes becomes very close to 0 (0.270-0.281=-0.1%). This finding suggests that the 
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parent banks reduce lending in their core foreign subsidiaries less in response to a negative real 
estate shock at home confirming De Haas and Van Horen (2013) and Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(2012) for the case of real estate shock transmission.
 21
 
For the banks more exposed to real estate markets, the transmission might be larger 
compared to less exposed banks. For a smaller sample of banks, there is information about 
mortgages, which is used in regressions 7 and 8.  When the ratio of mortgages in total loans for 
the parent and an interaction with parent house prices are included, the impact of parent real 
estate markets is significant and the coefficient is much larger - although the new controls are 
insignificant. A 1% decrease in parent country real estate prices seems to be associated with a 
0.85% decrease in credit growth. One would expect a positive interaction term for parent 
mortgage exposure, as the parent banks –which are more involved in home country real estate 
markets- may transmit the real estate shocks more. The negative coefficient and insignificance 
may be caused by the much smaller sample. Finally, the transmission of parent real estate prices 
may mainly be driven by capitally constraint banks. To see whether this is the case, an 
interaction term of parent real estate prices and parent equity is added to the regressions 9 and 
10, which turns up as insignificant. This suggests that the parent banks transmit the real estate 
price shocks at home regardless of their capitalization.  
3.3. The effects of information, securitization and policy responses on transmission 
In this section we focus first on the possible role of information between home and host 
countries as those may actually influence the cross-country transmission of real estate price 
shocks. Contiguity, geographical distance and a common language shared by home and host 
countries are used as proxies of information channels between home and host countries. In 
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regressions 1 to 6 in Table 8, the interaction terms of those information variables and real estate 
prices are all negative. The interaction of contiguity and real estate prices is significantly 
negative in regression 1, with foreign sample, but not significant in the regression 2 with the full 
sample. This suggests that the transmission is weaker among countries, which are neighbors and 
countries sharing a common language. Yet, the plain distance variables in regressions 5 and 6 are 
insignificant. 
Next, we turn to securitization opportunities for parent banks at home country. The use of 
securitization may mitigate transmission as –at least theoretically- banks can get rid of some real 
estate exposure smoothen their capital base, and this is partially observed in the U.S. setting 
(Berrospide et al., 2011). Yet Acharya et al. (2013) show that the risk is actually not transferred 
away from the banks, which provide explicit guarantees, and thus securitization may not be as 
effective. Furthermore, there is evidence linking the securitization activity with worse screening 
incentives, which may lead to lower loan quality (Keys et al., 2010), thus the impact of 
securitization on transmission is ambiguous. Indeed, when securitization variables (the amount 
and frequency of deals) are included in regressions 7 to 10 in Table 8, the interaction terms with 
the parent real estate prices are insignificant. In regressions with foreign subsidiaries only (7 and 
9) the coefficients of securitization variables are negative and significant indicating more 
securitization activities at home decreases the credit growth of the foreign subsidiary. This may 
be caused by the freeze in the securitization markets during the financial crisis.  
Parent countries’ policy responses may provide important clues both about the severity of the 




 Obviously, government would not like to see their support to their national 
financial systems are going abroad through foreign subsidiaries, as this will be politically 
unpopular. Thus governments involved in bolder policy responses may use moral suasion with 
their multinational banks to decrease credit supply abroad. Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 9 
include total direct fiscal outlays of the parent countries during 2007-2011, and regressions 3 and 
4 include significant nationalizations at parent country in the previous year. The coefficients of 
those variables are negative, as expected, and significant for the full sample regressions. The 
interaction terms, however, are mostly insignificant and negative. Only in regression 2 with 
fiscal outlays it becomes marginally significant. Thus the results do not provide supporting 
evidence for moral suasion by parent governments.  
Another important issue is that the transmission of real estate changes may be driven by 
financial crises. In regressions 5 and 6, we include domestic and foreign banking crises as 
control variables, as the occurrence of banking crises and real estate market busts are highly 
related especially during the recent crisis. The results are robust to the inclusion of local banking 
crisis controls.  
Bank regulation and supervision may have an impact on the credit supply of foreign 
subsidiaries as illustrated by Ongena et al. (2013), who find stricter regulation at home associated 
with lower lending standards at host countries. As the focus is on real estate prices, banking 
regulation regarding the real estate activities of parent banks is of interest. We use the World 
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benefits from such government support.   
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Bank’s banking regulation survey,
23
 more specifically a question from that survey, to show the 
possible impact of bank regulation on the transmission of the real estate shocks. The question is 
about the conditions under which banks can engage in real estate activities.
24
 Table 10 includes 
this variable for parent countries and interact it with parent real estate prices. The results suggest 
that both real estate prices and the interaction term are significant in all regressions (except the 
difference GMM regression 5), with a positive and a negative coefficient respectively. This 
means that the stricter the parent bank is regulated in real estate activities (the higher the variable 
the stricter the regulation), the lower the marginal impact of parent country real estate price 
shocks on credit supply of foreign subsidiaries is. This is because strictly regulated banks less 
exposed to real estate markets and thus do not have to cut back credit abroad, where prospects 
are better compared to home country experiencing a decline in housing prices.  In regression 1, 
for example, a bank, whose parent bank is unrestricted, decreases its credit supply by 0.6%, 
whereas if the parent bank is prohibited from real estate activities the bank decreases its credit 
growth only by 0.07% in response to 1% decrease in parent country real estate prices. 
3.4. Asymmetric transmission in good or bad times 
The impact of parent real estate shocks may be asymmetric, namely positive and negative 
shocks may have different impacts if substitution and spillover effects behave differently in 
response to real estate market price changes. From a theoretical perspective, the impact of both a 
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 Although the direct engagement of banks to real estate activities might not be very important compared to their 
indirect involvement through credit provision, this question should proxy for the general approach by the regulator. 
See Barth et al. (2013) for the details of the banking regulation survey. 
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The answers are categorized in 4 groups: Unrestricted (1 if a full range of these activities can be conducted directly 
in banks), Permitted (2 if a full range of these activities are offered but all or some of these activities must be 
conducted in subsidiaries or in another part of a common holding company), Restricted (3 if less than the full range 
of activities can be conducted in banks, or subsidiaries, or in another part of a common holding company or parent) 
and Prohibited (4 if none of these activities can be done in either banks or subsidiaries, or in another part of a 
common holding company or parent).  
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positive and a negative shock is ambiguous. A positive shock in the parent country not only leads 
to more funds to parent banks (a positive impact on foreign subsidiaries’ credit supply), which 
can be used in profitable subsidiaries and for diversification purposes (as banks may be cautious 
of following housing busts), but also more investment opportunities in home country, which in 
turn may soak up scarce capital from foreign subsidiaries (a negative impact). Following the 
Berrospide et al. (2011) paper, we call the first channel the spillover effect and the latter one the 
substitution effect. Yet the magnitudes of the impact of alternative effects may be different in 
positive and negative shocks. In Table 11, we differentiate the positive and negative parent real 
estate price changes by including two variables instead of one. Although all the coefficients are 
positive, only negative shocks have a significant and economically large impact on credit growth 
of foreign subsidiaries. Indeed, a 1% decrease in parent real estate market prices is associated 
with a 0.35% to 0.6% decrease in credit growth, depending on the sample and econometric 
approach. It seems that the spillover effect dominates the substitution effect in adverse shocks, 
but the two effects are balanced in the case of favorable shocks. One explanation may be that in 
the case of adverse shocks the constrained banks (with lower asset value and higher loan losses) 
have to reduce credit to keep capitalization at reasonable levels, thus spillover effect is pervasive 
and lending in foreign markets are reduced. At the same time substitution effect is not as 
effective as the parent bank cannot decrease credit growth in parent country quickly in case of a 
negative shock. In a favorable shock, however, both effects can be equally relevant, as parent 
banks will not be bound. Parent banks will increase lending in foreign markets (spillover effect) 
and at the same time would like to bring funds home to use good economic environment caused 
by the favorable shock (substitution effect). 
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As discussed earlier, internal capital market mechanisms may have been changed with the 
recent global financial crisis. Thanks to the longer time period covered here, the sample can be 
split as before and after the financial crisis. In Table 12 the sample is split into two to see the 
difference in the transmission of real estate price shocks before and after the recent global 
financial crisis. There are two main observations from these regressions. First, the transmission 
of real estate price shocks is prevalent especially after 2006, as the coefficient is significant and 
positive in regression 1 and 2 and in this period parent equity is highly insignificant suggesting 
no role for parent capitalization. Yet when the earlier period is considered in regressions 3 and 4, 
parent equity is positive and significant, suggesting that the parent banks were providing stability 
before the recent crisis period. In regressions 5 to 8, we differentiate between negative and 
positive real estate price changes. Negative house price changes are transmitted, parallel to 
earlier results, after 2006 but there is no significant transmission before 2007. Interestingly, in 
regression 6 positive house price shocks are also significant and positive, though marginally. 
This suggests that the foreign subsidiaries of multinational banks from parent countries 
experiencing housing price increases enjoyed credit growth compared to their domestic 
counterparts.  
3.5. Funding Channels 
In this last section of the empirical analysis, the funding structure of foreign subsidiaries is 
examined to see the effects of cross-border shocks. Equity growth is already used as the 
dependent variable in section 3.2,resulting in suggestive evidence regarding equity growth in 
foreign subsidiaries is responsive to real estate market price changes in parent countries. Yet this 
finding was not consistent throughout the specifications. In this section the focus is on debt 
financing of foreign subsidiaries. Indeed the increase in credit supply may not only be funded by 
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equity, but also by debt, which is divided into two components: long-term funding, and short-
term and deposit funding. The regressions in Table 13 feature these two variables as dependent 
variables with a specification similar to the baseline model.  
The results suggest that the response of foreign subsidiaries’ funding structure to the shocks 
in parent country real estate markets is mostly through their long-term funding. A one standard 
deviation decrease in parent country real estate prices (7.5%) leads to a decrease of 3.6% for the 
regression 2, where bank fixed-effects are employed for the whole sample. Indeed, in almost all 
specifications parent country real estate prices have a significantly positive impact on long-term 
funding growth of foreign subsidiary. On the other hand, short-term and deposit funding growth 
is responsive only in full sample regressions (8 and 10) and with a much smaller coefficient 
compared to long-term funding. In the sense that the deposit base is more stable compared to 
long-term funding, and thus, rather insensitive to the parent country real estate developments, the 
results are also consistent with the findings of De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2013),
 
 who also 
looked into the funding structure and found that funding structures mattered, especially during 
global crisis.
25
 The long-term funding may to a large extent be from the parent bank; 
unfortunately data on internal loans are not available from Bankscope. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the credit supply of banks in response to national and foreign real 
estate price changes. The findings suggest real estate shocks are transmitted by multinational 
banks; more specifically a 1% decrease in real estate prices in home country leads to a 0.2-0.3% 
decrease in credit growth in the foreign subsidiary. This impact is significant and economically 
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 They use the funding structure variables as control variables, whereas we try to explain the funding structure of 
foreign subsidiaries and thus use these variables as dependent variables.  
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large given the existence of sustained housing busts as seen during the recent financial crisis. A 
one standard deviation decrease in real estate prices in parent country (around a 7.5% decrease in 
the real house price index) leads to a decrease of around 2.5% credit growth in foreign bank 
subsidiary. The result is robust to alternative econometric methods and specifications -including 
the effects of banking crises, securitization, and policy responses of national government to 
recent financial crisis. 
Moreover, there is evidence indicating an asymmetry in the response of foreign bank 
subsidiaries; the transmission is significant for negative real estate shocks but not for the positive 
ones. The findings further suggest that home country banking regulation regarding the real estate 
activities of banks has an effect on the transmission channel, as the impact is smaller if parent 
banks are more restricted in their real estate activities at home. Finally, we look into funding 
channels of foreign subsidiaries. Long-term debt funding and equity funding is responsive to 
foreign real estate shocks, whereas short-term and deposit funding is rather insensitive. 
Our findings offer different policy implications for home and host country authorities. The 
transmission of real estate price changes in bad times such as the recent financial crisis may 
export the real estate shocks through foreign subsidiaries possibly deepening the ongoing crisis 
at host country. Yet, there is no evidence for the transmission of real estate shocks during boom 
period, meaning host countries should not worry about importing house price bubbles through 
increased credit supply of foreign subsidiaries.  
Multinational banks from countries with less informational problems, generous governments 
preferring bold policy responses to financial crises, and restrictive regulators reduce the credit 
supply less in response to a negative house price shock. Hence, those countries are desirable as 
bank owners from the perspective of host countries. For home authorities, multinational banking 
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is less of a concern, as it seems to provide a reliable safety net for a crisis period characterized by 
severe house price declines. The foreign subsidiaries of those banks reduce lending abroad in 
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Appendix. A1 Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Description Sources 
Gross credit growth Growth rate of real gross loans (calculated in deflated US dollars) Bankscope and WDI 
Credit growth Growth rate of real net loans (calculated in deflated US dollars)- excluding loan loss reserves Bankscope and WDI 
Asset growth Growth rate of real total assets (calculated in deflated US dollars) Bankscope and WDI 
Equity growth Growth rate of equity (calculated in deflated US dollars) Bankscope and WDI 
Long-term funding growth Growth rate of long-term funding (Senior debt maturing after 1 year, subordinated borrowing and other funding 
-calculated in deflated US dollars) 
Bankscope and WDI 
Profit* Lagged pretax profits over total assets Bankscope  
Net interest margin* Net interest income over loans and other earning assets Bankscope 
Deposit growth Growth rate of a bank's customer and short term funding (calculated in deflated US dollars) Bankscope and WDI 
Assets* Lagged log of assets in millions of 2000 US dollars Bankscope and WDI 
Internal funds* Internally generated funds (Net income/lagged loans) (Jeon et al. 2012) Bankscope 
Equity* Lagged equity over total assets Bankscope 
Liquidity* Lagged liquid assets over total assets Bankscope 
GDP growth* Rate of real per capita GDP growth WDI 
Inflation* Rate of change in consumer prices WDI 
GDP per capita* GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 U.S. dollars WDI 
Real estate prices* 
Lagged growth in real house price index (calculated by nominal HPI minus inflation) 
GPG, BIS, OECD and Dallas 
FED 
Parent real estate prices Lagged growth in real house price index of parent bank’s country (calculated by nominal HPI minus inflation) 
– 0 if a bank is domestic 
GPG, BIS, OECD and Dallas 
FED 
Equity index* Change in S&P Global Equity indices  WDI 
Interest rate* Long-term government bond yields in percentages (in most cases 10 year) IMF IFS and OECD 
Exchange rate* Growth rate of the real effective exchange rate, which measures the real value of a currency against a weighted 
average of several foreign currencies 
WDI 
Foreign Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is foreign owned with a least 50% of shares Bankscope 
Foreign bank Dummy variable that equals 1 if a bank is majority owned by a foreign bank Bankscope 
Banking crisis* Dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is suffering a banking crisis Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
Mortgages* Total mortgages over total net loans Bankscope 
Relative size Size –measured by assets- of subsidiary relative to its parent Bankscope 
Positive parent real estate 
prices 
Lagged growth in real house price index of parent bank’s country (calculated by nominal HPI minus inflation) 
– 0 if HPI growth in parent country is negative 
GPG, BIS and OECD 
Negative parent real estate 
prices 
Lagged growth in real house price index of parent bank’s country (calculated by nominal HPI minus inflation) 
– 0 if HPI growth in parent country is positive 
GPG, BIS and OECD 
Contiguity 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the home and host countries are contiguous 
CEPII (Mayer and Zignano, 
2011) 
Common language Dummy variable that equals 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the population in home and host 
countries 
CEPII (Mayer and Zignano, 
2011) 
Distance Geodesic distances (in ‘000 km) calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and CEPII (Mayer and Zignano, 
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longitudes of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) 2011) 
Parent country 
securitization 
Total amount of asset-backed issues, mortgage-backed (including commercial) issues and collateralized debt 
obligations collateralized by assets of some kind in the parent country over GDP of the parent country 
 
Commercial Mortgage Alert 
and Asset-Backed Alert 
Parent securitization 
number 
Ln (1+ Total number of asset-backed issues, mortgage-backed (including commercial) issues and collateralized 
debt obligations collateralized by assets of some kind in the parent country) 
 
Commercial Mortgage Alert 
and Asset-Backed Alert 
Parent fiscal outlay Fiscal cost of the recent financial crisis (2007-2011) (due to recapitalization, asset purchases and liquidity 
provision) for the parent country over GDP of the parent country 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
Significant nationalization Dummy variable that equals 1 if state takes control over important institutions during the previous year in the 
parent country 
Laeven and Valencia (2012) 
Parent real estate activity What are the conditions under which banks can engage in real estate activities? 1 if unrestricted, 2 if permitted, 
3 if restricted, 4 if prohibited. 
WB Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Surveys 


























A2. List of countries, number of banks and mean real HPI growth rates: 
International Standards Organization (ISO) 3-digit alphabetic codes are used for countries. Real HPI growth values are mean values in percentages over the 
mentioned period and they are not shown if the country has less than 3 observations for the relevant period. Foreign subsidiaries and Parent banks shows the 



























































growth   
(07-
11) 
ARE - 2 2.5 - 2.5 FRA* 87 303 5.5 8.5 0.1 MEX 15 3 1.2 - 0.8 
ARG 26 2 -3.8 -4.9 -2.8 GBR* 201 52 5.6 10.0 -2.1 MYS 41 7 2.1 1.4 3.2 
AUS* 30 5 5.2 7.0 1.9 GRC 15 61 2.2 6.9 -6.2 NLD* 66 68 3.1 6.3 -2.5 
AUT 30 98 0.5 0.0 1.1 HKG 25 29 2.4 -3.0 12.2 NOR* 8 10 5.0 5.8 3.4 
BEL* 40 78 4.2 5.7 1.5 HRV 42 - 0.4 1.5 -2.2 PHL 4 12 -3.8 -6.6 1.2 
BGR 26 - 2.8 6.8 -4.4 HUN 71 24 3.9 10.9 -7.3 POL 65 15 5.5 9.0 1.2 
BRA 6 - 18.7 - 18.7 IDN 50 11 -3.9 -4.5 -3.4 PRT 13 14 0.2 0.6 -0.6 
CAN* 74 - 4.6 5.3 3.2 IND - 20 0.9 - 0.9 RUS 90 40 6.0 15.4 -3.4 
CHE* 306 131 1.7 0.9 3.2 IRL* 87 12 5.2 10.7 -7.3 SGP 23 45 2.0 -0.7 6.9 
CHN 60 22 3.9 - 3.2 ISR - 80 2.5 0.1 6.8 SVK 20 3 3.5 - 1.6 
COL 9 6 0.4 -3.1 6.8 ITA* 27 127 2.6 5.5 -2.6 SVN 25 23 5.5 12.1 0.6 
CZE 49 10 1.7 - 1.4 JPN* 3 199 -3.4 -3.8 -2.5 SWE* - 98 5.8 8.0 1.9 
DEU* 130 422 -1.3 -1.6 -0.7 KAZ 13 2 -8.5 - -8.5 THA 18 4 -1.8 -1.6 -2.4 
DNK* 32 30 2.4 7.2 -6.2 KEN 2 - 0.3 0.7 -0.2 TUR 10 28 -8.1 - -8.1 
EGY 17 - -7.5 -2.2 - KOR* - 2 0.5 0.5 0.3 UKR 57 4 10.2 34.7 -19.2 
ESP* 28 55 4.0 9.5 -5.7 LTU 25 3 8.9 19.2 -7.6 USA* 156 128 0.9 4.5 -5.5 
EST 12 4 5.2 33.4 -11.7 LUX 174 40 5.5 7.6 0.7 ZAF 8 2 6.5 11.9 -3.2 
FIN* 8 5 4.4 6.8 -0.1 LVA 21 6 -6.1 - -6.1 
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Table 1. Summary statistics  
Gross credit growth is the growth rate of real gross loans, whereas credit growth the growth rate of real net loans. 
Equity growth is the growth rate of equity, long-term funding growth is the growth rate of long-term funding and 
deposit growth is the growth rate of a bank's customer and short term funding after dividing by the GDP deflator. 
Net interest margin is the net interest income over loans and other earning assets. Assets is the natural logarithm of 
total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Internal funds is the net income over lagged loans. Equity is equity over 
total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer prices. GDP 
growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 
dollars. Real estate prices is the lagged growth in real house price index. Equity index is the change in S&P Global 
Equity indices. Interest rate is the long-term government bond yields in percentages. Exchange rate is the growth 
rate of the real effective exchange rate.  Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and  Foreign bank is 
a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank. Banking crisis is a dummy variable for 
countries experiencing a banking crisis. Mortgages is total mortgages over total net loans. Profit is the pretax profit 
over total assets. Relative size is the size –measured by assets- of subsidiary relative to its parent. Net interest margin 
is the net interest income over loans and other earning assets. Contiguity is a dummy variable for neighboring home 
and host countries, Common language is a dummy variable for home and host countries where a language is spoken 
by at least 9% of both countries’ populations and Distance is geodesic distances (in ‘000 km) between the most 
important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) of home and host countries. Parent country securitization is 
the total amount of asset-backed issues, mortgage-backed (including commercial) issues and collateralized debt 
obligations collateralized by assets of some kind in the parent country over GDP of the parent country. 
 Parent securitization number is the number of those securitizations in the parent country plus 1 transformed in log.  
Parent fiscal outlay is the total fiscal cost of the recent financial crisis (2007-2011) (due to recapitalization, asset 
purchases and liquidity provision) for the parent country over GDP of the parent country. Significant nationalization 
is a dummy variable for parent countries where state takes control over important institutions during the previous 
year. Real estate activity is a categorical variable about under what the conditions banks can engage in real estate 
activities. It becomes 1 if unrestricted, 2 if permitted, 3 if restricted, 4 if prohibited. These variable explanations are 
the same for the variables regarding parent banks –named as Parent Variable Name. Note that bank level variables 
are lagged one period. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min 
Gross credit growth 24825 0.051 0.232 -0.999 0.996 
Credit growth 24834 0.049 0.237 -0.999 0.999 
Equity growth 24496 0.055 0.200 -0.998 0.999 
Long-term funding growth 14972 -0.005 0.345 -1.000 1.000 
Deposit growth 24123 0.052 0.228 -0.990 0.999 
Real estate prices 24834 0.007 0.089 -0.659 0.616 
Internal funds 22741 0.026 0.089 -0.985 1.000 
Profit 24716 0.013 0.036 -0.920 0.938 
Banking Crisis 24834 0.488 0.500 0 1 
Assets 24834 6.916 2.193 -1.141 14.523 
Equity 24834 0.121 0.120 0 1 
Liquidity 24834 0.190 0.209 0 0.999 
GDP growth 24834 1.117 3.028 -17.545 14.040 
Inflation 24834 2.935 2.696 -4.480 26.240 
GDP per capita 24834 27487.210 12600.160 402.629 56285.280 
Equity index 24834 0.056 0.306 -0.822 1.892 
Interest rate 23953 4.378 1.760 1 15.75 
Exchange rate 23605 -0.005 0.043 -0.161 0.296 
Foreign 24834 0.116 0.320 0 1 
Foreign bank 24834 0.109 0.312 0 1 
Parent real estate prices 2718 0.012 0.075 -0.479 0.576 
Parent Assets 2718 11.010 2.263 1.609 14.753 
Parent Equity 2718 0.104 0.162 0.002 1 
Parent Liquidity 2718 0.265 0.168 0 0.998 
Parent lagged net interest 
margin 2368 0.019 0.022 -0.015 0.482 
Parent GDP growth 2718 0.999 3.177 -17.545 13.605 
Parent Inflation 2718 2.222 2.218 -4.480 25.232 
Parent GDP per capita 2718 25240.350 10335.410 735.632 56285.280 
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Parent banking crisis 2718 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Parent profit 2672 0.011 0.032 -0.191 0.421 
Parent internal funds 2310 0.024 0.079 -0.324 0.925 
Parent Equity index 2718 0.029 0.342 -0.822 1.386 
Parent exchange rate 2567 0.002 0.042 -0.161 0.154 
Parent interest rate 2654 4.132 1.847 1 15.75 
Relative size 2672 0.144 0.467 0.000 4.926 
Parent Mortgages 526 0.222 0.199 0 0.996 
Contiguity 2723 0.288 0.453 0 1 
Common language 2723 0.233 0.423 0 1 
Distance 2723 3.284 3.714 0.060 18.550 
Parent country securitization 2723 0.011 0.023 0 0.150 
Parent securitization number 2723 2.301 1.826 0 8.006 
Parent fiscal outlay 2723 1.675 4.451 0 40.7 
Significant nationalization 2723 0.050 0.217 0 1 
Positive parent real estate 
prices 2718 0.032 0.053 0 0.576 
Negative parent real estate 
prices 2718 -0.020 0.039 -0.479 0 

































Table 2. Comparison of parent banks and foreign subsidiaries  
Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Internal funds is the net income over 
lagged loans. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. Inflation is the rate of 
change in consumer prices. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. GDP per capita is GDP per 
capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Real estate prices is the lagged growth in real house price index. Equity 
index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. Banking crisis is a dummy variable for countries experiencing a 
banking crisis. Mortgages is total mortgages over total net loans. Profit is the pretax profit over total assets. Positive 
t-test statistics mean that foreign bank subsidiaries have statistically larger mean values (and vice versa). *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.    
Foreign bank subsidiaries Parent Banks  
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean ttest 
Real estate prices 2718 0.020 2718 0.012 1.678** 
Assets 2718 7.134 2718 11.010 -85.456*** 
Equity 2718 0.132 2718 0.104 7.691*** 
Liquidity 2718 0.298 2718 0.265 5.559*** 
GDP growth 2718 1.519 2718 0.999 8.082*** 
Inflation 2718 3.257 2718 2.222 15.833*** 
GDP per capita 2718 23403.610 2718 25240.350 -5.583*** 
Banking crisis 2718 0.355 2718 0.418 -7.038*** 
Profit 2687 0.011 2672 0.011 0.989 
Internal funds 2361 0.032 2310 0.024 5.56*** 
Equity index 2718 0.060 2718 0.029 6.3*** 
Mortgages 515 0.221 526 0.222 -0.031 
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Table 3. Correlations for credit growth, house and stock market prices, banking crisis and funding variables 
Gross credit growth is the growth rate of real gross loans. Equity growth is the growth rate of real equity, long-term funding growth  is the growth rate of long-
term funding and Deposit growth  is Growth rate of a bank's customer and short term funding after dividing by the GDP deflator. Net interest margin is the net 
interest income over loans and other earning assets. Real estate prices is the lagged growth in real house price index. Equity index is the change in S&P Global 
Equity indices. Real estate activity is a categorical variable about under what the conditions banks can engage in real estate activities. It becomes 1 if 
unrestricted, 2 if permitted, 3 if restricted , 4 if prohibited. Banking crisis is a dummy variable for countries experiencing a banking crisis.  Only foreign bank 























Gross credit growth 1 
Parent real estate prices 0.089*** 1 
Real estate prices 0.130*** 0.234*** 1 
Equity index 0.095*** 0.222*** 0.186*** 1 
Parent Equity index 0.077*** 0.239*** 0.147*** 0.712*** 1 
Real estate activity 0.064*** -0.003 -0.083*** 0.038*** -0.022 1 
Parent real estate activity 0.041** -0.133*** -0.036** 0.011 0.037** -0.050*** 1 
Banking Crisis -0.121*** -0.244*** -0.385*** -0.154*** -0.147*** -0.056*** 0.079*** 1 














Gross credit growth 1  
Equity growth 0.302*** 1 
Long-term funding 0.285*** 0.166*** 1 
Deposit growth 0.499*** 0.263*** 0.150*** 1 
Net interest margin 0.003 0.015 -0.015 -0.042*** 1 
Parent real estate prices 0.089*** 0.092*** 0.057** 0.098*** -0.023 1 










Table 4. Benchmark regressions with House prices and other parent controls 
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Real estate prices is the lagged growth in real house price index. 
Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP 
growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 
2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. Same variables are included for parent banks and in full sample regressions parent bank 
variables are interactions with foreign bank dummy. Bank-level variables are lagged one period. Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and  
Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank. We estimate all regressions using year fixed effects. In regressions 1, 2, 3, 
4, 9 and 10, bank fixed effects and robust standard errors are used, whereas in regressions 5 and 6 country fixed effects and bank-level clustered standard errors 
are used.  In regressions 9 and 10, domestic real estate prices are instrumented by domestic population growth and bank regulation regarding real estate activity. 
In regression 7, two-step GMM difference estimator, and in regression 8,  two-step GMM system estimator are used. Regarding the validity of instrumentation 
Hansen’s J test for overidentifying restrictions and Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 are provided for the dynamic panel regressions, where 
only foreign bank subsidiaries are included.   *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
Bank FE |Credit growth|<0.5 POLS Dynamic Panel Domestic Real estate prices IV 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Difference System Foreign Full sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 
Real estate prices 0.066 0.075*** 0.038 0.021 0.118 0.080*** 0.011 -0.030 -0.228 -3.485 
(0.076) (0.029) (0.059) (0.022) (0.074) (0.028) (0.090) (0.077) (1.503) (2.370) 
Parent real estate 
prices 
0.257** 0.300*** 0.205** 0.232*** 0.149 0.170* 0.315** 0.253** 0.282* 0.691** 
(0.112) (0.103) (0.085) (0.079) (0.099) (0.092) (0.140) (0.117) (0.162) (0.338) 
Assets -0.123*** -0.115*** -0.050** -0.070*** -0.005 -0.001 -0.134** -0.003 -0.125*** -0.126*** 
(0.026) (0.009) (0.020) (0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.056) (0.009) (0.027) (0.016) 
Equity -0.031 -0.047 0.013 0.009 0.031 -0.083*** 0.216 0.017 -0.083 -0.301 
(0.183) (0.071) (0.136) (0.051) (0.078) (0.022) (0.289) (0.119) (0.304) (0.212) 
Liquidity 0.356*** 0.265*** 0.283*** 0.152*** 0.064* 0.031** 0.277* -0.026 0.363*** 0.337*** 
(0.082) (0.031) (0.058) (0.021) (0.035) (0.013) (0.147) (0.057) (0.092) (0.066) 
GDP growth 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009** 0.016*** 0.015 0.050* 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.023) (0.026) 
Inflation 0.010** -0.001 0.008*** -0.000 0.007* -0.005*** 0.009* 0.002 0.013 0.043 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.016) (0.029) 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity index -0.034 0.043*** -0.015 0.046*** -0.016 0.060*** -0.072* -0.015 -0.041 -0.009 
(0.036) (0.010) (0.026) (0.008) (0.032) (0.010) (0.039) (0.033) (0.048) (0.041) 
Parent Assets 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006* -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.009 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.013) 
Parent equity 0.025 0.017 -0.107 -0.126** 0.040 0.034 -0.044 0.009 0.028 0.052 
(0.090) (0.077) (0.071) (0.054) (0.047) (0.048) (0.122) (0.062) (0.095) (0.133) 
Parent Liquidity 0.079 0.110* 0.046 0.064 0.029 0.041 0.321** -0.031 0.070 0.100 
(0.070) (0.061) (0.060) (0.049) (0.036) (0.035) (0.128) (0.070) (0.071) (0.103) 
Parent  GDP growth -0.000 0.008*** -0.001 0.004** 0.002 0.006*** -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.006 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Parent Inflation -0.005 -0.000 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.007** -0.005 0.004 -0.005 0.003 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) 
Parent GDP per 
capita 
-0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Parent Equity index 0.032 0.042** 0.025 0.045*** 0.011 0.022 0.078** 0.047 0.024 -0.033 
(0.037) (0.019) (0.028) (0.015) (0.036) (0.018) (0.039) (0.037) (0.052) (0.058) 
Foreign -0.066 -0.012 -0.052** 0.033 
(0.059) (0.032) (0.022) (0.119) 
Foreign bank 0.084 0.053 0.071 -0.129 
(0.097) (0.069) (0.051) (0.229) 




N 2345 23290 2005 21680 2723 24862 1372 2338 2328 23238 
R-sq 0.181 0.127 0.187 0.153 0.147 0.104 0.172 -1.049 
Number of banks 603 4874 544 4618 502 880 
Number of 
instruments 551 758 
AB test AR2 0.752 0.222 
Hansen p-value 1.000 1.000 
First stage F stat 0.685 3.486 
OIR test 0.748 0.167 



















Table 5. Alternative dependent variables: Net credit growth and equity growth 
The dependent variable is net credit growth, which is the growth rate of real net loans in regressions 1-6 and equity growth in regressions 7-12. Real estate prices 
is the lagged growth in real house price index. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and 
liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer prices. GDP per 
capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. Same variables are included for parent 
banks. Bank-level variables are lagged one period. Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are 
majority owned by a foreign bank. We estimate all regressions using year fixed effects. In Bank FE regressions, bank fixed effects are used together with robust 
standard errors whereas in POLS regressions country fixed effects and bank-level clustered standard errors are used.  In regressions 5 and 11, two-step GMM 
difference estimator and in regression 6 and 12 two-step GMM system estimator are used. Regarding the validity of instrumentation Hansen’s J test for 
overidentifying restrictions and Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 are provided for the dynamic panel regressions, where only foreign bank 
subsidiaries are included.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
 
Bank FE POLS Dynamic Panel Bank FE POLS Dynamic Panel 
 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Difference System Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Difference System 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Dependent Variable: Net credit growth Dependent variable: Equity growth 
Real estate prices 0.072 0.090*** 0.115 0.096*** 0.015 -0.015 0.113* 0.071*** 0.136*** 0.083*** 0.169** 0.148*** 
 
(0.079) (0.030) (0.078) (0.029) (0.099) (0.081) (0.058) (0.024) (0.046) (0.022) (0.079) (0.053) 
Parent real estate prices 0.241** 0.292*** 0.134 0.152 0.279** 0.233* 0.099 0.093 0.104* 0.109* 0.236** 0.194** 
 
(0.113) (0.104) (0.101) (0.094) (0.137) (0.123) (0.082) (0.075) (0.061) (0.056) (0.110) (0.088) 
Assets -0.120*** -0.114*** -0.005 -0.001 -0.139** -0.006 -0.092*** -0.113*** -0.004 0.001* -0.191*** -0.012** 
 
(0.026) (0.009) (0.005) (0.001) (0.056) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.043) (0.006) 
Equity 0.044 -0.026 0.043 -0.084*** 0.347 0.041 -0.699*** -0.770*** -0.146*** -0.099*** -1.159*** -0.250*** 
 
(0.186) (0.072) (0.080) (0.022) (0.299) (0.118) (0.089) (0.039) (0.032) (0.009) (0.229) (0.063) 
Liquidity 0.361*** 0.294*** 0.071** 0.039*** 0.321** -0.039 0.015 0.003 -0.011 -0.000 0.088 0.010 
 
(0.083) (0.031) (0.036) (0.013) (0.143) (0.058) (0.042) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.096) (0.034) 
GDP growth 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008** 0.008*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Inflation 0.008* -0.003 0.005 -0.007*** 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity index -0.044 0.040*** -0.025 0.058*** -0.075* -0.023 0.125*** 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.150*** 0.067** 0.105*** 
 
(0.036) (0.011) (0.033) (0.010) (0.041) (0.034) (0.026) (0.009) (0.025) (0.009) (0.030) (0.026) 
Parent Assets 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006* -0.000 -0.002 0.006 0.007 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) 
Parent equity 0.029 0.015 0.041 0.034 -0.046 0.017 0.029 0.056 0.094*** 0.084*** 0.071 0.084 
 
(0.092) (0.078) (0.048) (0.049) (0.108) (0.065) (0.069) (0.057) (0.031) (0.030) (0.100) (0.056) 
Parent Liquidity 0.084 0.114* 0.035 0.045 0.325** -0.043 0.110* 0.128** 0.061** 0.060*** 0.138 0.047 
 
(0.071) (0.062) (0.037) (0.036) (0.142) (0.070) (0.059) (0.051) (0.024) (0.023) (0.115) (0.050) 
Parent  GDP growth -0.000 0.008*** 0.003 0.006*** -0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.006* 0.005* 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Parent Inflation -0.004 -0.000 0.006 0.007* -0.005 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.007** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
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Parent GDP per capita -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Parent Equity index 0.014 0.035* 0.004 0.021 0.058 0.043 0.003 0.009 -0.032 -0.008 -0.028 -0.072** 
 
(0.039) (0.020) (0.038) (0.019) (0.041) (0.039) (0.028) (0.014) (0.026) (0.013) (0.034) (0.032) 
Foreign 
 
-0.071  -0.052** 
  
-0.011  0.001 
  
(0.059)  (0.023) 
  
(0.042)  (0.019) 
Foreign bank 
 
0.083  0.077 
  
-0.105  -0.010 
  
(0.097)  (0.051) 
  
(0.076)  (0.036) 
Lagged credit growth 
  
  -0.067* 0.159***   
   
  (0.037) (0.031)   




  -0.132*** 0.064** 
   
  
  
  (0.031) (0.028) 
N 2340 23264 2718 24834 1366 2331 2699 25337 3108 26953 1626 2718 
R-sq 0.187 0.130 0.151 0.105 
  
0.189 0.157 0.171 0.120 
  
Number of banks 602 4871   500 878 677 5266   579 982 
Number of instruments 
  
  551 758 
  
  557 761 
AB test AR2 
  
  0.607 0.317 
  
  0.013 0.683 
Hansen p-value 
  
  1.000 1.000 
  






















Table 6. Robustness checks 
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate 
of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank –these dummies 
are only included in full sample regressions. Interest rate is the long-term government bond yields in percentages. Exchange rate is the growth rate of the real 
effective exchange rate. Same variables are included for parent banks, the benchmark controls are not reported in the table. Real estate prices is the lagged 
growth in real house price index. Bank-level variables are lagged one period. We estimate all regressions using bank and year fixed effects –except regressions 
11 and 12 where country-year fixed effects are used- and robust standard errors. In regressions 5 and 6 only observations after 2001 are included. In regressions 7 
and 8, foreign bank subsidiaries are matched with domestic banks at country-year level using propensity scoring based on size, equity and liquidity. In 
regressions 13 and 14 only observations from Dallas FED sample are included. Odd numbered regressions are only with foreign subsidiaries and even numbered 
regressions are with full sample.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
Macro  Lagged Dependent After 2001 PS matching (1to1) 
Country Level SE 
clustering 
Country-Year FE Dallas FED sample 
 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 




(0.113) (0.062) (0.082) (0.030) (0.079) (0.030) (0.183) (0.122) (0.093) (0.050) 
  
(0.260) (0.105) 
Parent real estate prices 0.292* 0.345** 0.368*** 0.405*** 0.246** 0.284*** 0.283* 0.323** 0.257*** 0.300*** 0.211* 0.200* 0.397 0.538** 
 



























































Lagged credit growth 
  
-0.026 -0.024* 
          
   
(0.035) (0.013) 
          
Exchange Rate 0.196 0.359*** 
            
 
(0.166) (0.075) 
            
Parent exchange rate 0.157 0.080 
            
 
(0.184) (0.171) 
            
Interest rate -0.029*** -0.021*** 
            
 
(0.009) (0.006) 
            
Parent interest rate -0.006 -0.002 
            
 
(0.009) (0.006) 
            
N 1705 9899 1971 21153 2071 21267 1261 2839 2345 23290 2723 24862 991 8619 
R-sq 0.162 0.155 0.183 0.136 0.210 0.139 0.176 0.131 0.181 0.127 0.378 0.220 0.112 0.144 
Number of banks 438 2199 513 4497 542 4592 322 819 603 4874 981 6446 243 1859 
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Table 7. Alternative specifications  
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate 
of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank –these dummies 
are only included in full sample regressions. Same variables are included for parent banks, these benchmark controls are not reported in the table. Real estate 
prices is the lagged growth in real house price index. Internal funds is the net income over lagged loans. Profit is the pretax profit over total assets. Net interest 
margin is the net interest income over loans and other earning assets. Parent mortgages is total mortgages over total net loans of the parent. Relative size is the 
size –measured by assets- of subsidiary relative to its parent. Bank-level variables are lagged one period. We estimate all regressions using bank and year fixed 
effects and robust standard errors. Odd numbered regressions are only with foreign subsidiaries and even numbered regressions are with full sample.  *, ** and 
*** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 
Real estate prices 0.133 0.077** 0.079 0.058* 0.065 0.056 0.126 0.076** 0.060 0.075*** 
 
(0.088) (0.030) (0.086) (0.030) (0.076) (0.055) (0.216) (0.031) (0.076) (0.029) 
Parent real estate prices 0.248** 0.336*** 0.169 0.261** 0.270** 0.240** 0.858* 0.843** 0.183 0.272** 
 
(0.122) (0.110) (0.139) (0.123) (0.117) (0.110) (0.455) (0.419) (0.130) (0.123) 
Internal funds X Parent internal funds 
-0.825 -0.842 
        
(0.769) (0.744) 
        
Internal funds 0.015 0.098** 
        
 
(0.140) (0.047) 
        
Parent internal funds -0.068 -0.021 
        
 
(0.120) (0.104) 




      
   
(0.294) (0.140) 
      
Net interest margin 
  
-1.325* -0.928*** 
      
   
(0.747) (0.185) 




      
   
(0.593) (0.554) 
      
Parent net interest margin 
  
-0.925 -0.148 
      
   
(0.720) (0.635) 
      
Relative size 
    
0.017 -0.005 
    
     
(0.039) (0.034) 
    
Relative size X Parent real estate prices     
-0.281* -0.041 
    
    
(0.147) (0.073) 
    
Parent mortgages 
      
-0.554 0.078 
  
       
(0.344) (0.136) 
  
Parent mortgages X Parent real estate 
prices 
      
-2.537 -1.805 
  




Parent equity X Parent real estate prices         
0.677 0.243 












































N 1775 20974 1595 20701 2300 9767 413 21267 2345 23290 
R-sq 0.200 0.141 0.192 0.146 0.183 0.159 0.242 0.123 0.181 0.127 




























Table 8. Information channel and securitization 
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate 
of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank –these dummies 
are only included in full sample regressions. Same variables are included for parent banks, these benchmark controls are not reported in the table. Real estate 
prices is the lagged growth in real house price index. Contiguity is a dummy variable for neighboring home and host countries, Common language is a dummy 
variable for home and host countries where a language is spoken by at least 9% of both countries’ populations and Distance is geodesic distances (in ‘000 km) 
between the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) of home and host countries. Parent country securitization is the total amount of asset-
backed issues, mortgage-backed (including commercial) issues and collateralized debt obligations collateralized by assets of some kind in the parent country over 
GDP of the parent country. Parent securitization number is the number of those securitizations in the parent country plus 1 transformed in log. Bank-level 
variables are lagged one period. We estimate all regressions using bank and year fixed effects and robust standard errors. Odd numbered regressions are only 
with foreign subsidiaries and even numbered regressions are with full sample.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 
Real estate prices 0.070 0.075*** 0.058 0.073** 0.066 0.071 0.068 0.075*** 0.061 0.075*** 
 
(0.075) (0.029) (0.076) (0.029) (0.076) (0.050) (0.075) (0.029) (0.075) (0.029) 
Parent real estate prices 0.360*** 0.356*** 0.358*** 0.409*** 0.293** 0.314** 0.227** 0.321*** 0.308** 0.350*** 
 
(0.120) (0.113) (0.132) (0.122) (0.140) (0.133) (0.115) (0.107) (0.121) (0.116) 
Contiguity X Parent real estate 
prices 
-0.319** -0.167 
        
(0.158) (0.167) 
        
Common language X Parent 
real estate prices 
  
-0.307* -0.351** 
      
  
(0.174) (0.162) 
      
Distance X Parent real estate 
prices 
    
-0.013 -0.011 
    
    
(0.028) (0.027) 
    
Parent country securitization  
      
-2.182*** -0.708 
  
      
(0.597) (0.526) 
  
Parent country securitization X 
Parent real estate prices 
      
11.714 -0.522 
  
      
(7.466) (7.084) 
  
Parent securitization number 
        
-0.031*** -0.002 
        
(0.011) (0.008) 
Parent securitization number X 
Parent real estate prices 
        
-0.008 -0.037 












































N 2345 23290 2345 23290 2345 10818 2345 23290 2345 23290 
R-sq 0.182 0.127 0.182 0.127 0.181 0.154 0.186 0.127 0.184 0.127 
Number of banks 603 4874 603 4874 603 2434 603 4874 603 4874 
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Table 9. Financial crisis regressions: Nationalizations, banking crises and recent global crisis 
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate 
of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank –these dummies 
are only included in full sample regressions. Same variables are included for parent banks, the benchmark controls are not reported in the table. Real estate prices 
is the lagged growth in real house price index. Parent fiscal outlay is the total fiscal cost of the recent financial crisis (2007-2011) (due to recapitalization, asset 
purchases and liquidity provision) for the parent country over GDP of the parent country. Significant nationalization is a dummy variable for parent countries 
where state takes control over important institutions during the previous year. (Parent) Banking crisis is a dummy variable for (parent) countries experiencing a 
banking crisis. Bank-level variables are lagged one period. We estimate all regressions using bank and year fixed effects and robust standard errors. Odd 
numbered regressions are only with foreign subsidiaries and even numbered regressions are with full sample.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 
1%.   
 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 
Real estate prices 0.063 0.073** 0.064 0.072** 0.063 0.034 
 
(0.076) (0.029) (0.076) (0.029) (0.076) (0.028) 
Parent real estate prices 0.249** 0.286*** 0.277** 0.313*** 0.236** 0.220** 
(0.113) (0.105) (0.114) (0.105) (0.113) (0.107) 
Parent fiscal outlay -0.007 -0.022* 
(0.013) (0.012) 
Parent fiscal outlay X Parent real estate prices 
-0.003 -0.006** 
(0.003) (0.002) 
Significant Nationalization -0.032 -0.023*** 
(0.032) (0.008) 




Banking Crisis -0.033 -0.070*** 
(0.030) (0.008) 
Parent Banking Crisis -0.040 -0.077*** 
(0.030) (0.019) 
Foreign -0.069 -0.068 -0.081 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Foreign bank 0.078 0.083 0.082 
(0.097) (0.097) (0.095) 
N 2345 23290 2345 23290 2345 23290 
R-sq 0.181 0.127 0.181 0.127 0.182 0.133 




Table 10. Bank regulation on real estate activities and house price transmission 
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate 
of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank –these dummies 
are only included in full sample regressions. Same variables are included for parent banks, these benchmark controls are not reported in the table. Real estate 
prices is the lagged growth in real house price index. Real estate activity is a categorical variable about under what the conditions banks can engage in real estate 
activities. It becomes 1 if unrestricted, 2 if permitted, 3 if restricted, 4 if prohibited. Bank-level variables are lagged one period. We estimate all regressions using 
bank and year fixed effects and robust standard errors. Odd numbered regressions are only with foreign subsidiaries and even numbered regressions are with full 
sample. Regarding the validity of instrumentation Hansen’s J test for overidentifying restrictions and Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 are 
provided for the dynamic panel regressions.   *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
Bank FE POLS Dynamic Panel 
Foreign  Full sample Foreign  Full sample Difference System 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 
Real estate prices 0.091 0.036 0.123 0.040 0.020 -0.079 
(0.085) (0.036) (0.083) (0.034) (0.114) (0.091) 
Parent real estate prices 0.769*** 0.982*** 0.584*** 0.633*** 0.494 0.657*** 
(0.235) (0.234) (0.202) (0.198) (0.382) (0.234) 
Parent real estate activity X 
Parent real estate prices 
-0.175** -0.231*** -0.183*** -0.192*** -0.083 -0.206*** 
(0.077) (0.076) (0.071) (0.071) (0.129) (0.078) 
Parent real estate activity 0.000 0.010 0.004 0.007 0.001 0.004 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008) 
Lagged gross credit growth -0.092** 0.139*** 
(0.039) (0.035) 
N 1786 17536 2032 18770 1112 1811 
R-sq 0.174 0.133 0.149 0.109 
Number of banks 477 3880 420 659 
Number of instruments 414 762 
AB test AR2 0.776 0.176 
Hansen p-value 1.000 1.000 
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Table 11. Asymmetric effects of parent country house price shocks 
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate 
of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and  Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank –these dummies 
are only included in full sample regressions. Same variables are included for parent banks, these benchmark controls are not reported in the table. Positive real 
estate prices is the lagged growth in real house price index if positive and zero otherwise. Negative real estate prices is the lagged growth in real house price 
index if negative and zero otherwise.  Bank-level variables are lagged one period. We estimate all regressions using year fixed effects. In regression 1 (foreign 
subsidiaries only) and 2 (full sample), bank fixed effects and robust standard errors are used. In regression 3, two-step GMM difference estimator, and in 
regression 4,  two-step GMM system estimator are used. Regarding the validity of instrumentation Hansen’s J test for overidentifying restrictions and Arellano 
and Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 are provided for the dynamic panel regressions, where only foreign bank subsidiaries are included.   *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 
Real estate prices 0.069 0.075*** 0.011 -0.035 
 
(0.076) (0.029) (0.091) (0.077) 
Positive parent real estate 
prices 
0.131 0.153 0.061 0.165 
(0.150) (0.141) (0.187) (0.147) 
Negative parent real estate 
prices 
0.465** 0.547*** 0.621*** 0.368* 
(0.207) (0.202) (0.238) (0.208) 
Lagged gross credit growth 
-0.073** 0.173*** 
(0.037) (0.031) 
N 2345 23290 1372 2338 
R-sq 0.181 0.127 
Number of banks 603 4874 502 880 
Number of instruments 577 796 
AB test AR2 0.759 0.213 








Table 12. Sample split regressions: Transmission before and after the financial crisis 
The dependent variable is Gross credit growth, which is the growth rate of real gross loans. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US 
dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate 
of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. 
Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and  Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign bank –these dummies 
are only included in full sample regressions. Same variables are included for parent banks, the benchmark controls –except Parent equity- are not reported in the 
table. Positive real estate prices is the lagged growth in real house price index if positive and zero otherwise. Negative real estate prices is the lagged growth in 
real house price index if negative and zero otherwise.  Bank-level variables are lagged one period. In regressions 1, 2, 5 and 6 observations after 2006 are 
included, whereas in regressions 3, 4, 7 and 8 only observations before 2007 are used. We estimate all regressions using year fixed effects. In regression 1 
(foreign subsidiaries only) and 2 (full sample), bank fixed effects and robust standard errors are used. In regression 3, two-step GMM difference estimator, and in 
regression 4,  two-step GMM system estimator are used. Regarding the validity of instrumentation Hansen’s J test for overidentifying restrictions and Arellano 
and Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 are provided for the dynamic panel regressions, where only foreign bank subsidiaries are included.   *, ** and *** 
denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
Year>=2007 Year<2007 Year>=2007 Year<2007 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Gross credit growth 
Real estate prices 0.107 0.084** 0.012 0.136** 0.110 0.084** 0.014 0.135** 
 
(0.093) (0.034) (0.187) (0.065) (0.093) (0.034) (0.188) (0.066) 
Parent real estate prices 0.212* 0.360*** -0.101 -0.171 
(0.123) (0.119) (0.345) (0.318) 
Positive parent real estate prices 0.105 0.312* -0.262 -0.266 
(0.175) (0.173) (0.355) (0.352) 
Negative parent real estate prices 0.365* 0.429* 0.728 0.365 
(0.219) (0.220) (1.145) (1.090) 
Parent equity -0.243 -0.254 0.357** 0.315** -0.243 -0.255 0.353** 0.316** 
(0.149) (0.162) (0.150) (0.123) (0.149) (0.162) (0.150) (0.124) 
Foreign -0.131 -0.123 -0.129 -0.125 
(0.087) (0.109) (0.087) (0.109) 
Foreign bank 0.346** -0.190 0.352** -0.189 
(0.144) (0.207) (0.144) (0.207) 
N 1471 14043 698 8355 1471 14043 698 8355 
R-sq 0.249 0.145 0.085 0.111 0.250 0.145 0.086 0.111 





Table 13. Funding structure regressions: What can be the transmission channel? 
The dependent variable is long-term funding growth in regressions 1-6 and Deposit growth in regressions 7-12. Real estate prices is the lagged growth in real 
house price index. Assets is the natural logarithm of total assets in constant 2000 US dollars. Equity is equity over total assets and liquidity is liquid assets over 
total assets. GDP growth is the rate of real per capita GDP growth. Inflation is the rate of change in consumer prices. GDP per capita is GDP per capita in 
thousands of constant 2000 dollars. Equity index is the change in S&P Global Equity indices. Same variables are included for parent banks. Bank-level variables 
are lagged one period. Foreign is a dummy variable for foreign owned banks and Foreign bank is a dummy variables banks with are majority owned by a foreign 
bank. We estimate all regressions using year fixed effects. In Bank FE regressions, bank fixed effects are used together with robust standard errors whereas in 
POLS regressions country fixed effects and bank-level clustered standard errors are used.  In regressions 5 and 11, two-step GMM difference estimator and in 
regression 6 and 12 two-step GMM system estimator are used. Regarding the validity of instrumentation Hansen’s J test for overidentifying restrictions and 
Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation of order 2 are provided for the dynamic panel regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%,  5% and 1%.   
 
Bank FE POLS Dynamic Panel Bank FE POLS Dynamic Panel 
Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Difference System Foreign Full sample Foreign Full sample Difference System 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Dependent variables: Long-term funding growth Dependent variables: Deposit growth 
Real estate prices 0.114 -0.084 0.038 -0.069 0.074 0.178 0.068 0.030 0.100 0.034 0.153 0.085 
(0.163) (0.052) (0.138) (0.048) (0.201) (0.160) (0.077) (0.030) (0.074) (0.029) (0.225) (0.249) 
Parent real estate prices 0.481** 0.457** 0.246 0.359** 0.522* 0.467** 0.109 0.194* 0.096 0.174** 0.034 0.092 
(0.225) (0.199) (0.168) (0.148) (0.299) (0.214) (0.109) (0.102) (0.091) (0.086) (0.490) (0.766) 
Assets -0.018 -0.085*** -0.004 0.006*** -0.059 -0.010 -0.158*** -0.128*** -0.010** -0.000 -0.333** 0.005 
(0.027) (0.012) (0.007) (0.001) (0.060) (0.010) (0.033) (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.154) (0.086) 
Equity -0.013 0.128 0.072 0.051 0.045 0.333 0.748*** 0.535*** 0.133* 0.057*** 1.859*** 0.355 
(0.284) (0.121) (0.130) (0.033) (0.459) (0.211) (0.227) (0.082) (0.075) (0.022) (0.394) (0.437) 
Liquidity -0.110 -0.122*** -0.021 -0.019 0.159 -0.039 -0.243*** -0.218*** -0.022 -0.026** -0.153 -0.150 
(0.101) (0.040) (0.043) (0.017) (0.214) (0.062) (0.079) (0.030) (0.028) (0.010) (0.542) (0.531) 
GDP growth 0.007 0.005** 0.008 0.004* 0.001 -0.001 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.016* 
(0.007) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.014) (0.008) 
Inflation 0.002 -0.009*** 0.008 -0.008*** 0.008 0.003 0.008* -0.002 0.004 -0.006*** 0.002 0.003 
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.019) (0.058) 
GDP per capita -0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Equity index 0.006 0.145*** 0.061 0.124*** -0.002 0.040 -0.004 0.077*** 0.005 0.098*** -0.033 -0.010 
(0.060) (0.020) (0.056) (0.018) (0.081) (0.059) (0.034) (0.012) (0.035) (0.012) (0.115) (0.183) 
Parent Assets -0.018 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 0.013 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.033) (0.033) 
Parent equity -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 0.015 -0.106 0.064 -0.102 -0.044 0.080 0.061 -0.187 -0.002 
(0.151) (0.109) (0.082) (0.077) (0.209) (0.095) (0.105) (0.090) (0.053) (0.050) (0.261) (0.257) 
Parent Liquidity -0.035 0.079 -0.027 -0.046 -0.270 -0.091 0.088 0.134* 0.077** 0.077** 0.247 0.175 
(0.141) (0.118) (0.065) (0.060) (0.308) (0.088) (0.085) (0.074) (0.035) (0.034) (0.404) (0.563) 
Parent  GDP growth -0.027*** -0.009** -0.011** -0.005 -0.018 -0.013** 0.004 0.011*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.006 0.001 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.015) (0.035) 
Parent Inflation -0.022* -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.017 -0.005 -0.000 0.011** 0.005 0.006* 0.002 0.002 
(0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.021) 
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Parent GDP per capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Parent Equity index 0.244*** 0.059 0.176*** 0.050* 0.171** 0.216*** 0.033 0.042** 0.023 0.015 0.030 0.039 
(0.074) (0.037) (0.067) (0.030) (0.076) (0.081) (0.037) (0.019) (0.037) (0.018) (0.126) (0.285) 
Foreign 0.028 -0.025 -0.002 -0.053** 
(0.111) (0.030) (0.046) (0.022) 
Foreign bank 0.203 0.153* -0.022 0.022 
(0.171) (0.082) (0.108) (0.048) 
Lagged long-term funding growth -0.163*** 0.044 
(0.047) (0.042) 
Lagged deposit growth -0.067 0.073 
(0.058) (0.062) 
N 1215 14582 1442 15864 650 1146 2458 23873 2855 25497 1444 2455 
R-sq 0.113 0.075 0.118 0.095 0.192 0.120 0.128 0.072 
Number of banks 332 3395 257 459 630 4987 530 921 
Number of instruments 329 539 554 760 
AB test AR2 0.036 0.401 0.199 0.502 
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Countries with more than 5 years of data. HPI growth is bounded by +-25%.
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Variable: Real HPI growth Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Full sample 
2007-2011 287 -0.972 12.035 -47.923 57.678 
2002-2006 245 6.685 12.726 -65.869 61.609 
1998-2001 148 1.686 12.801 -83.505 40.979 
|Real HPI growth|<25% 
2007-2011 268 -0.505 8.051 -22.913 23.733 
2002-2006 224 4.931 7.269 -19.358 23.904 
1998-2001 138 1.678 7.299 -20.342 19.141 
Panel c 
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Mean Real HPI (annual change %)
Mean S&P Global Equity Indices* (annual change %)
*Stock market observations with larger than 50% or lower than -50% are dropped from mean calculation.
Panel b 
